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Abstract
Like avoiding labor protection law via foreign subcontractors, banning
deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with
participants in the role of experimenters who, similar to properly incen-
tivized subcontractors, can gain by deceiving those in the role of proper
participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception
by `experimenter-participants' in a dictator experiment and test whether
participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception and whether
deception aﬀects behavior of `participant-participants'. We ﬁnd that most
participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception and no diﬀer-
ence in behavior of participant-participants between the treatments, even
when - after debrieﬁng - repeating the experiment without deception. Our
results can be viewed as a contribution to study the eﬀects of unethical
behavior via outsourcing it by letting subcontractors do the harm.
Keywords: Experimental economic methods; Deception; Experiments.
JEL classiﬁcation: A12; C90.
1 Introduction
Deception in experiments is not just an academic discussion in the ivory tower
of experimental researchers.1 Putting a ban on the use of certain practices
such as the payment of unfair wages to workers does not prevent employers
to engage in such exploitative practices by subcontracting. Indeed, in many
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1For a discussion of the use of deception in economic experiments, see Hey [1991], Davis
and Holt [1993], and especially Andersson [2002].
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Western economies the eﬀects of labor regulations can be easily circumvented
by outsourcing the hiring of workers to foreign subcontractors. In this sense,
deception in experiments is analogous to exploitative practices on the labor
market. One can avoid being guilty of engaging in deception by allowing a
properly incentivized participant to deceive the other participants.2
In this sense we, the authors of this study, engage in subcontracting and
therefore can study deception, a taboo in experimental economics, without get-
ting 'our hands dirty'. We do not engage in deception. As experimenters, we
allow and properly incentivize a participant in the experimenter role, called
'experimenter-participant', to deceive participants in the usual role of experi-
mental participants, labelled as 'participant-participants'.
The experimental scenario is a variant of the dictator game (Forsythe et al.
1994) in which two participant-participants - an allocator and a recipient - must
decide without knowing that the experimenter-participant can increase her pay-
oﬀ substantially by excluding one of them - the recipient - from interaction. To
motivate our choice of experimental scenario, imagine an allocator who sacriﬁces
own payoﬀ to help the recipient. Doing so strongly depends on trusting that
the recipient actually gains from own sacriﬁce. On the other hand, an allocator
who cares a lot about the recipient might be very frustrated when learning -
after debrieﬁng - that her solidarity might have been wasted. This, in our view,
suggests that we might observe the often feared eﬀects of deception in experi-
ments, i.e. that after once being deceived one will doubt the instructions forever
(see e.g. Hey 1991, Davis and Holt 1993, and Ledyard 1994).
To capture deception eﬀects, we repeat without forewarning the experiment
after debrieﬁng participant-participants on the actual role of the experimenter-
participant. In the repetition of the experiment, the two participant-participants
play in the same role and the experimenter-participant is unable to exclude any
participant-participants from interaction. Based on this experimental scenario,
we test for diﬀerences in behavior of participant-participants in the same (dic-
tator) game context before and after debrieﬁng of possible deception. Inspite of
the apparent reasons why deception might impact on behavior of participant-
participants, we ﬁnd no evidence for its eﬀects. This is in line with the results
of previous studies, ﬁnding no clear deception eﬀects.3 We also support the
2Uri Gneezy has pointed out and encouraged us to discuss the analogy of studying deception
in experiments without deception and such subcontracting. The latter has been investigated
experimentally also in the context of principal-agent relationships and delegation, see e.g.
Hamman et al. [2010] and Bartling and Fischbacher [2012].
3Ortmann and Hertwig [2002] review a wide range of psychology studies involving de-
ception. They ﬁnd mixed results on the impact of deception on negative emotions such as
embarassement, sadness, or discomfort. Some studies show that deceived participants do not
experience such emotions. In contrast, other studies reveal that such negative emotions have
an impact on the behavior of participants. They also ﬁnd that suspicion impacts on behav-
ior of participants in experiments. However, such eﬀect appears to be signiﬁcant only when
experiments are similar to previous ones. Jamison et al. [2008] test the eﬀect of deception
regarding the identity of other players on future behavior in experiments diﬀerent to the ini-
tial one. They ﬁnd evidence that deception has some (minor) impact on both the selection
of participants and the behavior of participants who return to the lab. However, they cannot
diﬀerentiate between the eﬀect of selection of participants and the eﬀect of deception. For a
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hypothesis that strong incentives to deceive others induce people to deceive.
This is consistent with the evidence from previous experiments (e.g. Gneezy
2005), that people are more likely to deceive the higher the amount they gain
from this. More generally, our results show that ruling out 'bad practices' by
banning them without guaranteeing that they cannot be outsourced via sub-
contracting is ineﬀective.
To justify our choice of experimental scenario further, let us compare it with
another one, more in the spirit of deception game experiments (e.g. Gneezy
2005, Charness and Dufwenberg 2005, Hurkens and Kartik 2009, and Sutter
2009). In the so-called 'yes/no game' (Güth et al. 2005), unlike in the ultimatum
game (Güth et al. 1982), a responder must accept or reject the oﬀer by a proposer
without knowing the actual oﬀer. This could be implemented by ﬁrst allowing
the proposer to send some stated oﬀer but not necessarily the true one to the
responder who then, depending on the stated oﬀer, can accept or reject the
oﬀer.
In our view, such a scenario more often than not would trigger suspicion
concerning the truth of the message. So the disappointment when actually
learning that one has been deceived by the proposer will not come completely
unexpected. In our view, deception eﬀects are more likely and stronger when
one has been unaware of possible deception and when actually done something
very costly, based on one's trust that everything is done as perceived. We do
not claim that deception games like the one just described cannot capture the
crucial aspects of our deception design, but (still) consider being deceived by
the social scenario - whether or not there exists a recipient - as a very unsettling
experience from which one could expect more detrimental eﬀects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental sce-
nario is described in details below. This is followed by a presentation of the
experimental procedures and hypotheses, and by an illustration of the experi-
mental results. Some discussion and ﬁnal remarks conclude the paper.
2 The experimental scenario
In the experimental scenario, there is an experimenter-participant who can 'em-
ploy' either one or two participant-participants to play a variant of the dictator
game. More precisely, there are three roles:
 role E of an experimenter-participant,
 role A of an allocator, and
 role R of a recipient.
We will refer to E as experimenter-participant, and to A and R as allocator and
recipient, respectively.
more general discussion of the use of deception in experiments, see e.g. Bonetti [1998], Hey
[1998], McDaniel and Starmer [1998], and Hertwig and Ortmann [2008].
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In the dictator game, the allocator is given a positive monetary amount p
to share with the recipient. This monetary amount p can be either small, i.e.
p = p, or large, i.e. p = p, thus 0 < p < p. The allocator must decide how
much of p is passed on to R. The recipient decides the minimum allocation by A
that she is willing to accept. Thus, like in reward allocation (see Shapiro 1975
and Mikula 1973) and dictator experiments (see Forsythe et al. 1994), R cannot
punish A but can reject an unacceptable gift, and possibly voice her anger (see
Xiao and Houser 2005). Neither A nor R know whether p or p can be shared
when deciding. A and R condition their choices on both p and p knowing only
the probability distribution, i.e. how likely p = p and p = p are. To run the
dictator experiment, E receives a positive monetary endowment e. This also
includes the show-up fee s to each the allocator and recipient, thus e− 2s > 0.
In the experiment, there are two treatments. In the main treatment, E can
save the show-up fee to R and additionally collect what A gives to R by not
hiring R. Since A and R are initially not aware that E can avoid hiring R and
this is known to E, by not hiring R the E-participant deceives A and R. In the
control treatment, E must hire both A and R, that rules out deception.
In both treatments, there are two tasks. In each task, A and R play the dic-
tator game which E has implemented. The ﬁrst task is known to all participants
from the beginning of the experiment while the second task is only announced
after the ﬁrst task.4
In the main treatment, E can avoid hiring R, and thus engage in deception,
only in the ﬁrst task. In the second task, E must hire both A and R. At the end
of the ﬁrst task and before the second task is announced, A and R are debriefed
of the possibility of deception by E in only the ﬁrst task. In the instructions
for the second task, A and R are informed that in the second task E must hire
both A and R. We shall come back to this in Section 3.
Let us now describe the rules of the main treatment in more detail. First, E
decides whether to hire only A or both A and R, without knowing whether p or
p can be shared between A and R (she only knows how likely p = p and p = p
are). Second, A chooses her allocations, i.e. a for p = p and a for p = p, where
0 ≤ a ≤ p and 0 ≤ a ≤ p, without knowing that E can avoid hiring R. Third, R
chooses her minimum acceptable gifts, i.e. m for p = p and m for p = p, where
0 ≤ m ≤ p and 0 ≤ m ≤ p, without knowing the amounts a for p = p and a
for p = p, and without knowing that E can avoid hiring her. Finally, A and R
are debriefed that E had the possibility to choose only A (see speciﬁcally the
so-called 'A and R-Message' in the Online Appendix B, Section B.2.2, allerting
participant-participants of the possibility of deception in the ﬁrst task).5 After
that, E, A and R are informed that A and R play the same dictator game in the
4The use of unannounced tasks in experiments is relatively common amongst psychologists
and has also been employed by economists, see e.g. Andreoni [1988], Fehr and Gächter [2000],
Masclet et al. [2003]. The main purpose of using unannounced tasks is to prevent choices
in one task to be inﬂuenced by anticipating later ones, for example in the sense of repeated
interaction eﬀects.
5This 'A and R-Message' appeared as a separate screenshot which participants could not
overlook.
4
Table 1: A summary of payoﬀs in the main treatment.
Role
Task E chooses p E A R
1
both A and R
p e− 2s p− a+ s a+ s if a ≥ m
s if a < m
p e− 2s p− a+ s a+ s if a ≥ m
s if a < m
only A
p e− s+ a p− a+ s 0
p e− s+ a p− a+ s 0
2 both A and R
p e− 2s p− a+ s a+ s if a ≥ m
s if a < m
p e− 2s p− a+ s a+ s if a ≥ m
s if a < m
same roles once again and that this time E must hire both A and R. Only after
having made their decisions for the second task, A and R learn their respective
choices for both tasks, whether p or p can be shared for both tasks, and also
whether E hired only A or both A and R in the ﬁrst task.
Payoﬀs for both tasks and all roles in the main treatment are summarized in
Table 1. In the ﬁrst task, if E hires both A and R, A receives p−a+ s for p = p
and p − a + s for p = p; E earns e − 2s for both p = p and p = p; R receives
a+ s if a ≥ m and s if a < m for p = p and a+ s if a ≥ m and s if a < m for
p = p. However, if E chooses only A, nothing changes for A, E receives e− s+a
for p = p and e− s+ a for p = p and R receives nothing from A and E. In the
second task, E is forced to hire both A and R. Thus, payoﬀs to E, A, and R are
the same as when R is hired voluntarily.
In the control treatment, all what diﬀers is that E is forced to hire both A
and R in the ﬁrst task. Thus, in both tasks, payoﬀs are the same as when E
recruits both, A and R, in the main treatment.
Given the above scenario, do we expect new insights for dictatorial reward
allocation (see Shapiro 1975, Mikula 1973, and Forsythe et al. 1994)? What
could be new for the control treatment, without the possibility of deception,
would be a change of gift-giving and acceptance behavior in the repetition. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no learning study of repeated dictator game
play. This is surprising since generosity might change with experience and since
often dictator generosity is mentioned, for example, to justify social preferences
(see Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 and Fehr and Schmidt 1999). For the main
treatment, deception and debrieﬁng may crowd out more or less completelely
generosity of allocations. At the same time, allocations may also increase as a
result of participant-participants feeling more solidarity with each other (they
both are 'victims'). Either way, even if there are no signiﬁcant deception eﬀects,
we might observe rather similar 'experience eﬀects' for both treatments.
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3 Experimental procedures and hypotheses
One diﬀculty with implementing the main treatment was to guarantee the
availability of participants in the role R who, depending on the choice of the
experimenter-participant, might be excluded from interaction. Hence, without
informing the other participants about this (if not at the end of the experi-
mental session), the non-hired recipient received the show-up fee s from the
experimenters, i.e. the authors of this paper. Otherwise payments were due
as detailed in Section 2, where one of the two tasks was randomly drawn with
equal probabilities for payment at the end of the session.
We were naturally interested in 'seducing' the experimenter-participant by
letting her gain a considerable amount by excluding the recipient from interac-
tion. Thus, we set e = 15 and s = 5, with 1 point=1 EURO, also to compensate
participants in the role R in case of a small gift. The other parameters were
p = 8 and p = 24. The latter was 80% likely, because we predicted allocators
with p = p to hide greed by giving at most a = p/2.
We invited 51 groups of participants for the roles E, A, and R for the 8
sessions of the main treatment and 50 groups of participants for the same roles
for the 8 sessions of the control treatment. A session included only complete
groups of three participants to rule out any doubt that there exists a participant
for each role.
In the ﬁrst task, the E-participants in the 101 E-A-R groups were shown the
instructions to A and R-participants, so it was known to all participants that:
1. p = 8, p = 24, s = 5 and p = 24 has 80% probability,
2. A must choose a for p = 8 and a for p = 24 while R must choose m for
p = 8 and m for p = 24, and a, a, m, and m are restricted to integers in
the range 0 ≤ a ≤ 8, 0 ≤ a ≤ 24, 0 ≤ m ≤ 8 and 0 ≤ m ≤ 24, respectively,
3. if p = p, A receives p − a + s while R receives a + s if a ≥ m and s if
a < m, and if p = p, A receives p− a+ s while R receives a+ s if a ≥ m
and s if a < m,
4. E is an experimenter-participant who can, for instance, observe the inter-
action between A and R.6
The instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task in both treatments
are given in Section B.2.1 of the Online Appendix B.
In addition to instructions to A and R-participants, E-participants were
given speciﬁc instructions. In the main treatment, E-participants were informed
of the following:
1. e = 15,
6This avoids deception by commission, i.e. participant-participants were not told lies about
the role of E. Instead, this involves deception by ommission, i.e. participant-participants were
not told everything about E at the beginning of the experiment (for a deﬁnition of these
two types of deception, see Hey 1998). Only the use of erroneous information is usually not
tolerated by economists (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2008).
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2. E can choose between hire only A and both A and R,
3. by not hiring R, E earns e−s+a if p = p and e−s+a if p = p while R gets
nothing from A and E and A earns the amount as in the instructions to
A and R; otherwise, E earns e− 2s, while both A and R earn the amount
as in the instructions to A and R,
4. A and R are not aware that E can choose between 'only A' and 'both A
and R',
5. A and R will eventually be informed that E in fact can exclude R, and
that by not hiring R the E-participant can save s and collect a or a.7
The instructions to E-participants in the main treatment, including the debrief-
ing message that is sent to A and R at the end of the ﬁrst task ('A and R
Message'), are shown in Section B.2.2 of the Online Appendix B.
In the control treatment, E knows that:
1. e = 15,
2. she must monitor A and R,8
3. she receives e− 2s.
Also the instructions to E-participants in the control treatment in the ﬁrst task
are given in the Online Appendix B, Section B.2.3.9
In the second task of the main treatment all participants know that A and R
face the same decision task again while E cannot avoid hiring R. In the control
treatment, the second task is just a repetition. In the main treatment, A and
R know E's payoﬀ and their own payoﬀ. The instructions to A, R, and E-
participants for the second task in both treatments are shown in Section B.3 of
the Online Appendix B.
3.1 Hypotheses
The experiment is designed to test for deception eﬀects: do allocations in the
main treatment become less generous after deception and debrieﬁng? Or do
they rather tend to increase to compensate for what happened in the ﬁrst task?
Similarly, do acceptance thresholds increase or decrease? Since we cannot tell
what to expect, our alternative hypothesis is two-sided. We test whether allo-
cations change after debrieﬁng of possible deception, i.e. whether in the main
treatment gifts and acceptance thresholds in the second task diﬀer from those in
7Ortmann and Hertwig [2002] report on evidence from nine psychology studies showing
that direct experience of deception aﬀects behavior in experiments while it is dubious whether
the mere possibility of deception can alter behavior in experiments.
8This is exactly what A and R also read in the instructions to A and R-participants.
9After the instructions, all participants were asked to answer eight questions designed to
check their understanding of the game and the payoﬀ rules. Participants were asked to correct
their mistakes (if any) until they could ﬁnd the correct answer.
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the ﬁrst task. We also compare choices across treatments, i.e. we test whether
in the second task choices of allocators and recipients in the main treatment
diﬀer from those in the control treatment. In addition, we test for diﬀerences
in behavior between the ﬁrst and second task in the control treatment and also
diﬀerences in behavior for p = p and p = p. The former is to capture possible
experience eﬀects. The null hypothesis is always that choices do not diﬀer.
Since E would gain a considerable amount by hiring only A, we expect
experimenter-participants to engage in deception. In particular, we compare
the actual proportion of E-participants choosing only A with the proportion of
E-participants choosing only A that would be observed if E-participants made
their choices randomly, i.e. if E-participants chose 'only A' and 'both A and R'
with equal probabilities.
4 Results
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
of Economics in Jena (Germany). Participants were students from various dis-
ciplines at the University of Jena. They were randomly allocated to sessions
of the two treatments and also to the roles E, A, and R within each session.
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment was
computerized, using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The average duration of a ses-
sion was about 45 minutes. The average, minimum, and maximum earnings for
each and both tasks and each and all roles in the treatments are summarized in
Table 6 and Table 7 in the Online Appendix A.
4.1 Choices of experimenter-participants
Of 51 E-participants in the main treatment, 46 hired only A. This obviously
rejects the null hypothesis that experimenter-participants made their choice
randomly (binomial test, p-value is 0.000).10
4.2 Choices of allocators and recipients
The choices of allocators and recipients for both tasks in each treatment are
summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. These are complemented by Figure 1 and
Figure 2 in the Online Appendix A, showing the distributions of choices by
allocators and recipients for p = p and p = p, respectively. In both treatments
and tasks, there are hardly any 'overgenerous allocations' in the sense of a > p/2
and a > p/2. The average a consistently exceeds the average a. Recipients are
willing to accept less than what allocators give on average. For both allocators
and recipients in both treatments, choices made in the second task do not diﬀer
so much from those made in the ﬁrst task.
10All reported p-values are two-sided.
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Table 2: A summary of allocations in the two treatments.
p = p p = p
Treatment Treatment
Main Control Main Control
Task Task Task Task
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
obs. 51 51 50 50 51 51 50 50
mean 2.451 2.627 2.38 2.4 6.902 7.176 6.5 6.38
st. dev. 1.591 1.523 1.51 1.565 4.553 4.39 4.082 4.333
min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max. 6 5 6 6 14 13 12 13
Table 3: A summary of minimum acceptable allocations in the two treatments.
p = p p = p
Treatment Treatment
Main Control Main Control
Task Task Task Task
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
obs. 51 51 50 50 51 51 50 50
mean 1.373 1.412 1.66 1.64 2.843 3.039 3.6 3.66
st. dev. 1.823 1.152 1.56 1.495 3.319 3.594 4.454 4.47
min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max. 5 4 6 6 12 13 17 17
To see whether choices of allocators change after debrieﬁng of possible de-
ception, we compare the distributions of allocations in the two successive tasks
in the main treatment. We ﬁnd no large or signiﬁcant diﬀerence (one-sample
permutation test, p-value is 0.192 for p = p and 0.395 for p = p). We also test
for diﬀerences in allocations made in the second task between the treatments.
We try several non-parametric tests (e.g. Siegel and Castellan 1988), comparing
various aspects of the distributions of allocations in the treatments. However,
again we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Mann-Whitney test, p-value is 0.384 for
p = p and 0.29 for p = p; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value is 0.87 for p = p
and 0.246 for p = p; two-samples permutation test, p-value is 0.499 for p = p
and 0.371 for p = p). This suggests that either deception and experience eﬀects
are compensatory or that deception has no eﬀect at all on choices of allocators
in the main treatment. In view of no-feedback information regarding A and
R-behavior between tasks we consider experience eﬀects rather unlikely. This
is conﬁrmed by the data in the control treatment, showing no diﬀerence be-
tween the ﬁrst and second task (one-sample permutation test, p-value is 1.000
for p = p and 0.716 for p = p). Thus, we conclude that there are no serious
deception eﬀects.11
11That average allocation was consistently though not signiﬁcantly higher for both tasks
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Concerning recipients, we perform analogous tests. We ﬁnd no large or
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in choices between the ﬁrst and second task in the main
treatment (one-sample permutation test, p-value is 0.909 for p = p and 0.646
for p = p), and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in choices made in the second task
between the treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p-value is 0.714 for p = p and
0.852 for p = p; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value is 0.991 for p = p and 0.602
for p = p; two-samples permutation test, p-value is 0.436 for p = p and 0.459
for p = p). There is also no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two tasks in the
control treatment (one-sample permutation test, p-value is 1.000 for p = p and
0.892 for p = p). Thus, as for allocators, deception has no eﬀects on choices
of recipients. The lack of signiﬁcant eﬀects for both allocators and recipients
supports the null hypothesis that choices do not diﬀer, neither between the two
tasks of the main treatment, nor across the two treatments' second tasks, nor
between the ﬁrst and second task in the control treatment.12
4.3 Further results
Our results suggest that deception has no eﬀect on average behavior of allocators
and recipients. However, do individual choices of allocators and recipients vary
in the second task in the main treatment?
When we consider the distributions of choices of allocators in the two treat-
ments, who choose a smaller, identical, or higher gift in the second task relative
to the ﬁrst task, we see that in both treatments most allocators choose the same
gift in both tasks, consistently for p = p and p = p. There is no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the treatments (Fisher's exact test, p-value is 0.205 for p = p
and 0.136 for p = p). Similarly, most recipients choose the same minimum
acceptable gift in both tasks in both treatments (see Table 8 and Table 9 in
the Online Appendix A for details of the distributions). Here again, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatments (Fisher's exact test, p-value is
0.916 for p = p and 0.945 p = p). These results rule out any doubt against 'no
eﬀect' of deception. In addition, they support that experience plays no role.
in the main treatment relative to the control treatment is not surprising: individual choices
quite naturally are positively correlated between two successive and similar tasks, and also
between p = p and p = p within each task. Since participants were randomly allocated to
sessions, the slight diﬀerence in the ﬁrst task must be due to random selection eﬀects.
12For control, the distributions of allocations in the ﬁrst task reveal no large or signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p-value is 0.787 for p = p and 0.577
for p = p; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value is 0.999 for p = p and 0.858 for p = p; two-
samples permutation test, p-value is 0.866 for p = p and 0.656 for p = p). Also for recipients,
there is no diﬀerence in the ﬁrst task between the treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p-value is
0.629 for p = p and 0.717 for p = p; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value is 0.605 for p = p and
0.924 for p = p; two-samples permutation test, p-value is 0.334 for p = p and 0.35 for p = p).
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Table 4: Results of a random-eﬀects tobit regression of the relative share of p
allocated.
Model
Covariate 1 2 3 4
_24 -0.029*** (0.008) -0.029*** (0.008) -0.024** (0.011) -0.024** (0.011)
_2 0.009 (0.008) -0.001 (0.011) 0.003 (0.013) 0.005 (0.015)
_MAIN 0.03 (0.044) 0.020 (0.044) 0.020 (0.044) 0.020 (0.044)
_2*MAIN - 0.020 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.017 (0.019)
_24*2 - - -0.009 (0.015) -0.012 (0.019)
_24*2*MAIN - - - 0.004 (0.022)
const. 0.269*** (0.032) 0.274*** (0.032) 0.272*** (0.032) 0.272*** (0.032)
obs. 404 404 404 404
groups 101 101 101 101
Table 5: Results of a random-eﬀects tobit regression of the minimum relative
share of p accepted.
Model
Covariate 1 2 3 4
_24 -0.063*** (0.007) -0.063*** (0.007) -0.066*** (0.010) -0.066*** (0.010)
_2 0.004 (0.007) 0.001 (0.010) -0.001 (0.012) -0.001 (0.013)
_MAIN -0.038 (0.043) -0.041 (0.043) -0.041 (0.043) -0.041 (0.043)
_2*MAIN - 0.006 (0.014) 0.006 (0.014) 0.006 (0.017)
_24*2 - - 0.005 (0.014) 0.005 (0.017)
_24*2*MAIN - - - 0.001 (0.020)
const. 0.179*** (0.031) 0.180*** (0.031) 0.181*** (0.031) 0.181*** (0.031)
obs. 404 404 404 404
groups 101 101 101 101
Note: Covariates are size of p (_24), task number (_2), treatment (_MAIN),
and interactions of task and treatment (_2*MAIN), size of p and task (_24*2),
and size of p, task, and treatment (_24*2*MAIN). Standard errors are given in
parentheses: ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
4.4 Regression analysis
We support the above results by two random-eﬀects tobit regressions, with the
choices of allocators and the choices of recipients as dependent variables. Table
4 reports estimates of a model with the relative share of p allocated to R as the
dependent variable. Table 5 gives the estimates of a model with the minimum
relative share of p accepted by R as the dependent variable. In both models, we
use three non-interactive covariates: _24 (a dummy for the amount p, equal to
1 if p = p, 0 otherwise), _2 (a dummy for the task number, equal to 1 if the
task is 'second', 0 otherwise), and _MAIN (a dummy variable for the treatment,
equal to 1 if the treatment is 'main', and 0 otherwise). We also consider three
interaction variables: _2*MAIN (equal to 1 if the task is 'second' and is in the
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main treatment, and 0 otherwise), _24*2 (equal to 1 if p = p and the task is
'second', and 0 otherwise), and _24*2*MAIN (equal to 1 if p = p, the task is
'second', and is in the main treatment, and 0 otherwise).
The results in Table 4 and Table 5 show that only _24 has a marginally
signﬁcant impact, both on the amount allocated to R and on the minimum
acceptable gift for R. All other variables have no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Thus, alloca-
tors give relatively less (even though they allocate more in absolute terms) when
p = p, and there is no diﬀerence in allocations between tasks and treatments.
Similarly, recipients expect relatively less when p = p, and again there is no
diﬀerence between tasks and treatments.
5 Conclusions
Deception does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect behavior, at least it does not signiﬁ-
cantly change behavior in our experiment. More speciﬁcally, we cannot reject
the null hypotheses that deception has no eﬀect on behavior. Choices are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent before and after deception and debreﬁng, and also do not
signiﬁcantly vary across treatments. This is also reﬂected in the individual
choices of allocators and recipients, who allocate the same amount respectively
expect the same amount to be allocated before and after debrieﬁng. In addition,
allocations do not change across tasks in the treatment without deception. In
general, gifts are relatively lower when the amount that allocators and recipients
can share is large. This is anticipated by recipients who expect relatively less.
Are these results surprising? Inspite of the obvious reasons why deception
might change behavior in our experiment, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects. This
might be due to our design being limited to only one repetition after debrieﬁng,
that rules out long-run deception eﬀects. Thus, one could view our experimental
scenario as a worst case for observing deception eﬀects. Another reason for the
lack of eﬀect might be participant-participants blaming us, the authors of this
paper, as responsible for the deception, for example because we, the authors,
are responsible for 'seducing' the experimenter-participants. This is possible
but it is hard to imagine that it matters for participant-participants whether
the experimenter-participants or we, the authors, are responsible. After all,
experimenter-participants could have resisted more often to seduction.13 One
of our anonymous referees speculated that it might matter where the experiment
was run, namely in Germany with most participants being German. There might
be diﬀerent behavioral responses to negative emotions such as disappointment
in diﬀerent countries or cultures, and the level of trust and more generally what
people expect from each other may vary with culture and the historical period,
although with the 'global economy' this becomes less likely. Nevertheless, one
could run the experiment with diﬀerent cultural groups to explore this issue
more thoroughly. The other hypothesis that we support is that people exploit
the opportunity to gain by deceiving others. Apparently, experimentalists in
13In their recent experiment, Bartling and Fischbacher [2012] ﬁnd that responsibility attri-
bution can be eﬀectively shifted from a principal to the agent.
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economics can easily avoid engaging in deception by 'hiring' or 'subcontracting'
participants in the role of experimenters and incentivizing them properly.
From a methodological point of view, observing that deception does not
change behavior of participants in experiments may be seen as comforting, since
bad experiences may not question trusting instructions in future experiments.
Furthermore, banning deception alone seems to be as insuﬃcient as regulations
to protect participants against deception in experiments or workers against ille-
gal employment contracts which can be circumvented by outsourcing the hiring
of labor via subcontractors. If one wants to ban deception or impose other
ethical requirements, the addressees should not only be the experimenter, re-
spectively the employer, but all parties involved.
For a broader picture of deception in general, the conclusion of no eﬀect of
deception after debrieﬁng may be seen as encouraging: after having experienced
deception we do not question our behavior fundamentally, as one could expect,
since human life provides plenty of such experiences. On the other hand, this
could also mean that we are already so pessimistic that a further bad experience
does not matter much. It is from this perspective that observing no deception
eﬀects might be troublesome. We might be living in a world where one more
deception does not matter much since we anyhow expect the worst from each
other.
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Online Appendix A: Tables and ﬁgures
Table 6: Experimental earnings in the main treatment.
Role
Task E A R All
1
(
14.27, 5, 22
) (
18.86, 8, 29
) (
5.98, 5, 19
) (
13.04, 5, 29
)
2
(
5, 5, 5
) (
18.65, 8, 29
) (
10.25, 5, 18
) (
11.3, 5, 29
)
Both
(
9.64, 5, 13.5
) (
18.75, 8, 29
) (
8.12, 5, 18.5
) (
12.17, 5, 29
)
Note: The ﬁrst, second, and third component are average, minimum, and max-
imum payoﬀ (EUROS).
Table 7: Experimental earnings in the control treatment. The ﬁrst, second, and
third component are average, minimum, and maximum payoﬀ (EUROS).
Role
Task E A R All
1 (5, 5, 5)
(
20.22, 9, 29
) (
9.66, 5, 17
) (
11.63, 5, 29
)
2 (5, 5, 5)
(
20.3, 9, 29
) (
10, 5, 18
) (
11.77, 5, 29
)
Both (5, 5, 5)
(
20.26, 9, 29
) (
9.83, 5, 17.5
) (
11.7, 5, 29
)
Note: The ﬁrst, second, and third component are average, minimum, and max-
imum payoﬀ (EUROS).
Table 8: Frequency distributions of the direction of changes of allocations in the
second task relative to the ﬁrst task in the two treatments.
p = p p = p
Treatment Less Same More All Less Same More All
Main 5 34 12 51 10 26 15 51
Control 5 40 5 50 9 34 7 50
Both 10 74 17 101 19 60 22 101
Table 9: Frequency distributions of the direction of changes of minimum accept-
able allocations in the second task relative to the ﬁrst task in the two treatments.
p = p p = p
Treatment Less Same More All Less Same More All
Main 4 44 3 51 5 39 7 51
Control 5 42 3 50 6 37 7 50
Both 9 86 6 101 11 76 14 101
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Figure 1: The histograms of allocations and minimum acceptable allocations for
p = p.
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Figure 2: The histograms of allocations and minimum acceptable allocations for
p = p.
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Online Appendix B: Experimental instructions14
B.1 General instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You can ﬁnd more detailed
instructions below. Please take your time to read those instructions carefully.
If you have a mobile phone, please switch it oﬀ. During the experiment you are
not allowed to talk to other participants. If you have any question, please raise
your hand and one of us will come to help. If you violate these rules, we have
to exclude you from the experiment and any payoﬀs.
In the experiment we use ¿ (EUROS) payments. Any amount of money
that you may earn in this experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of
the experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e. the other participants
will not see your earnings. Please note that the instructions are written in male
gender, but refer to both genders equally.
B.2 Detailed instructions for the ﬁrst task
B.2.1 Detailed instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task
in both treatments
In the experiment you will interact with two other participants. The three
participants will be randomly assigned to one of the three roles A, E, and R,
i.e. each group of three participants has one A, one E, and one R-participant.
You are an A or R-participant. We will inform you later in which of the two
roles (A or R) you will participate. We now describe the process of decision
making where we speak of A, E, and R instead of A, E, and R-participants.
First: a random draw decides whether A and R can share ¿8 or ¿24 where
the probability of sharing ¿24 is 80%, i.e. on average, one in ﬁve A, E, R
groups can share only ¿8. Only E learns which of the amounts has randomly
been selected.15
Second: without knowing whether he, A, and R can share ¿8 or ¿24, A
must decide how much of ¿8 should be passed on to R in case A and R can
only share ¿8 and how much of ¿24 should be passed on to R in case A and
R can share ¿24. Note the oﬀer x, passed on to R, must be non-negative and
no more than ¿8 if A and R can share ¿8, and non-negative and no more than
¿24 if A and R can share ¿24.
Third: before R learns about the oﬀer choice x by A, and without knowing
whether he, R, and A can actually share ¿8 or ¿24, R must choose the minimum
oﬀer x by A that he, R, is willing to accept in case A and R can share ¿8 and
the minimum oﬀer x by A that he, R, is willing to accept in case A and R can
share ¿24.
Payoffs: payoﬀs are determined as follows:
14The reported instructions are a translation from the original instructions in German.
15In the mean treatment, E was informed of the actual amount that A and R could share
just after having made her decision.
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If A and R can share ¿8, A earns ¿8 minus the oﬀer x plus the show-up fee
of ¿5 regardless of what R decides; R earns the same show-up fee plus the oﬀer
x if x is no less than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept and only ¿5
if x is less than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept.
If A and R can share ¿24, A earns ¿24 minus the oﬀer x plus the show-up
fee of ¿5 regardless of what R decides; R earns the same show-up fee plus the
oﬀer x if x is no less than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept and
only ¿5 if x is less than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept.
E essentially acts as experimenter who, for instance, can observe your choices.
So, for instance, if A and R can only share ¿8 your E-participant can see that
this is respected in the sense that A gets ¿8 minus x plus the show-up fee of
¿5 and that R gets the same show-up fee of ¿5 plus the oﬀer x if x is no less
than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept and only the show up fee of
¿5 if x is less than the minimum oﬀer that R is willing to accept.
B.2.2 Detailed instructions to E-participants for the ﬁrst task in the
main treatment
In the experiment you will interact with two other participants. The three
participants will be randomly assigned to one of the three roles A, E, and R,
i.e. each group of three participants has one A, one E, and one R-participant.
You are the E-participant in your group. As such will have to be aware of the
common instructions for the A and R-participant. What you will now read are
the instructions for both, the A and R-participant. The following instructions
are the only ones read by the A and R-participant.
Insert [B.2.1] detailed instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task
in both treatments here.
Now that you are aware of the situation which A and R confront we can tell
you what you, as the E-participant, have to decide. As an experimenter E you
receive a budget of ¿15 for monitoring the choice x by the A-participant. There
is no additional budget when you additionally monitor the acceptance choice of
x by R. Thus, you must engage the A-participant but you can avoid engaging
the R-participant.
Note that the show-up fee of ¿5 for A and R must be paid from your budget.
Thus you, as E, earn ¿15 minus twice the show-up fee, i.e., ¿(15 − 2 × 5)
= ¿5, if you decide to engage both A and R, whereas you earn ¿15 plus x
minus one show-up fee, i.e. ¿(10 + x), if you decide to engage only A. A
and R earn as the amounts which you have seen when reading the [Detailed
instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task in both treatments] above,
if you decide to engage both A and R. However, only A earns the same amounts
as in the [Detailed instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task in both
treatments] whereas R earns nothing, if you decide to engage only A.
Note: When deciding about x the A-participant is not at all aware that
you can avoid engaging R as you have seen when reading [Detailed instructions
to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task in both treatments] above. Thus A
expects that there is actually an R-participant who may or may not be willing
20
to collect x. However, ﬁnally A and R learn that you had the choice of (not)
engaging R. Actually, the corresponding message to A and R will be:
A and R-Message: The E-participant was not just monitoring your in-
teraction: E had the choice between engaging you both, A and R, or only A.
Actually by not engaging R the E-participant could gain by not having to pay
the show-up fee of ¿5 to R and by additionally collecting the amount x which
A has passed on to R. The E-participant, however, could not avoid engaging A
and paying the show-up fee of ¿5 out of the budget of ¿15.
B.2.3 Detiled instructions to E-participants for the ﬁrst task in the
control treatment
In the experiment you will interact with two other participants. The three
participants will be randomly assigned to one of the three roles A, E, and R,
i.e. each group of three participants has one A, one E, and one R-participant.
You are the E-participant in your group. As such will have to be aware of the
common instructions for the A and R-participant. What you will now read are
the instructions for both, the A and R-participant. The following instructions
are the only ones read by the A and R-participant.
Insert [B.2.1] detailed instructions to A and R-participants for the ﬁrst task
in both treatments here.
Now that you are aware of the situation which A and R confront we can
tell you that, as an experimenter E, you receive a budget of ¿15 for monitoring
the choice x by the A-participant. There is no additional budget when you
additionally monitor the acceptance choice of x by R. Nonetheless, you must
engage the A-participant and you cannot avoid engaging the R-participant.
Note that the show-up fee of ¿5 for A and R must be paid from your budget.
Thus you, as E-participant, will earn ¿15 minus twice the show-up fee, i.e.,
¿(15− 2× 5) = ¿5.
B.3 Detailed instructions for the second task
B.3.1 Detailed instructions to A-participants for the second task in
the main treatment
Before you and the R-participant learn what E decided and before you and the
R-participant are informed on what the other participant decided, you and the
R-participant must repeat the same decision task once again. The amount that
you and R can share will be the same as before. As before, you must decide how
much of ¿8 and how much of ¿24 you should pass on to R. R must decide the
minimum oﬀer x that he, R, is willing to accept in case you and R can share ¿8
and the minimum oﬀer x that he, R, is willing to accept in case you and R can
share ¿24. E will also participate in the same role as he did before. However,
this time E must engage you, A, and he cannot avoid engaging R. The show-up
fee of ¿5 must be paid from his budget. Thus E earns ¿(15− 2× 5) = ¿5 for
sure and you, as A, earn ¿8 minus the oﬀer x plus ¿5 in case you and R can
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share ¿8 and ¿24 minus the oﬀer x plus ¿5 in the event that A and R can
share ¿24, regardless of what R decides.
Note: Once you and the R-participant have completed your decision task
you will learn what the E-participant decided in the previous task. You will
also learn what the R-participant decided in both tasks and whether you and
the R-participant can share only ¿8 or ¿24. This will determine your actual
payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random draw will decide whether you, E,
and R are paid the earnings from this task or the earnings from the previous
task. Note the amount from this task is as probable as the amount from the
previous task.
B.3.2 Detailed instructions to R-participants for the second task in
the main treatment
Before you and the A-participant learn what E decided and before you and the
A-participant are informed on what the other participant decided, you and the
A-participant must repeat the same decision task once again. The amount that
you and A can share will be the same as before. As before, A must decide how
much of ¿8 and how much of ¿24 he should pass on to you. You must decide
the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept in case you and A can share
¿8 and the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept in case you and A can
share ¿24. E will also participate in the same role as he did before. However,
this time E must engage A and he cannot avoid engaging you, R. The show-up
fee of ¿5 must be paid from his budget. Thus E earns ¿(15− 2× 5) = ¿5 for
sure and you, as R, earn the show-up fee of ¿5 plus the oﬀer x if x is no less
than the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept and only the show-up
fee of ¿5 if x is less than the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept.
Note: Once you and the A-participant have completed your decision task
you will learn what the E-participant decided in the previous task. You will
also learn what the A-participant decided in both tasks and whether you and
the A-participant can share only ¿8 or ¿24. This will determine your actual
payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random draw will decide whether you, E,
and A are paid the earnings from this task or the earnings from the previous
task. Note the amount from this task is as probable as the amount from the
previous task.
B.3.3 Detailed instructions to E-participants for the second task in
the main treatment
Before the A and R-participants learn how you decided and, and before A learns
what R decided and R learns what A decided, A and R must repeat the same
decision task once again. The amount that A and R can share will be the same
as before. You will also participate in the same role as you did before, i.e.
E. As before, you receive a budget of ¿15 for monitoring the choice x by the
A-participant. There is no additional budget when you additionally monitor
the acceptance choice of x by R. However, this time you must engage the A-
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participant and you cannot avoid engaging the R-participant. The show-up fee
of ¿5 for A and R must be paid from your budget. Thus you, as E-participant,
will earn ¿15 minus twice the show-up fee, i.e., ¿(15− 2× 5) = ¿5.
Note: Once the A and R-participants have completed their decision task
they will learn whether you decided to engage them both, A and R, or only A.
A will also learn what R decided in both tasks and R will learn what A decided
in both tasks. Both A and R will learn whether they can share only ¿8 or ¿24.
This will determine their actual payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random
draw will decide whether you, A, and R are paid the earnings from this task
or the earnings from the previous task. Note the amount from this task is as
probable as the amount from the previous task.
B.3.4 Detailed instructions to A-participants for the second task in
the control treatment
Before you and the R-participant are informed on what the other participant
decided, you and the R-participant must repeat the same decision task once
again. The E-participant will also participate in the same role as he did before.
The amount that you and R can share will be the same as before. As before,
you must decide how much of ¿8 and how much of ¿24 you should pass on to
R. R must decide the minimum oﬀer x that he, R, is willing to accept in case
you and R can share ¿8 and the minimum oﬀer x that he, R, is willing to accept
in case you and R can share ¿24. As before, you earn ¿8 minus the oﬀer x
plus the show-up fee of ¿5 in case you and R can share ¿8 and ¿24 minus the
oﬀer x plus the show-up fee of ¿5 in case you and R can share ¿24, regardless
of what R decides.
Note: Once you and the R-participant have completed your decision task
you will learn what the R-participant decided in both tasks and whether you and
the R-participant can share only ¿8 or ¿24. This will determine your actual
payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random draw will decide whether you, E and
R are paid the earnings from this task or the earnings from the previous task.
Note the amount from this task is as probable as the amount from the previous
task.
B.3.5 Detailed instructions to R-participants for the second task in
the control treatment
Before you and the A-participant are informed on what the other participant
decided, you and A must repeat the same decision task once again. The E-
participant will also participate in the same role as he did before. The amount
that you and A can share will be the same as before. As before, A must decide
how much of ¿8 and how much of ¿24 he should pass on to you. You must
decide the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept in case you and A
can share ¿8 and the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept in case
you and A can share ¿24. As before, you earn the show-up fee of ¿5 plus the
oﬀer x if x is no less than the minimum oﬀer x that you are willing to accept
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and only the show-up fee of ¿5 if x is less than the minimum oﬀer x that you
are willing to accept.
Note: Once you and the A-participant have completed your decision task
you will learn what the A-participant decided in both tasks and whether you and
the A-participant can share only ¿8 or ¿24. This will determine your actual
payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random draw will decide whether you, E and
A are paid the earnings from this task or the earnings from the previous task.
Note the amount from this task is as probable as the amount from the previous
task.
B.3.6 Detailed instructions to E-participants for the second task in
the control treatment
Before the A-participant learns what R decided and the R-participant learns
what A decided, A and R must repeat the same decision task once again. The
amount that A and R can share will be the same as before. You will also
participate in the same role as you did before, i.e. E. As before, you receive
a budget of ¿15 for monitoring the choice x by the A-participant. There is
no additional budget when you additionally monitor the acceptance choice of
x by R. Nonetheless, you must engage the A-participant and you cannot avoid
engaging the R-participant. The show-up fee of ¿5 for A and R must be paid
from your budget. Thus you, as E-participant, will earn ¿15 minus twice the
show-up fee, i.e. ¿(15− 2× 5) = ¿5.
Note: Once the A and R-participants have completed their decision task
A will learn what R decided in both tasks and R will learn what A decided in
both tasks. Both A and R will learn whether they can share only ¿8 or ¿24.
This will determine their actual payoﬀs for each task. After that, a random
draw will decide whether A and R are paid the earnings from this task or the
earnings from the previous task. Note for you the amount from this task is the
same as the amount from the previous task.
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